By Ivan Alexandrov (Macedonian Patriotic Organization “TA” Australia Inc. 1993)
Important Periods
In examining the conditions, and form of the struggle for national liberation since the appearance of the Macedonian Question to this very day, three distinct periods emerge.
We consider these periods, not as of critical importance to Macedonian history, but to highlight how within the passage of time the Bulgarian position has been continually eroded. Accordingly, we have to alternatively consider the struggle for national unification and autonomy, the resistance to denationalization and finally the importance of the historic truth and its appropriate recognition.
Unfortunately in our historiography we only have factual works for the first period (so-called Ottoman), the other two subjects are still at an elementary phase. However, it is important to acknowledge that some historians and translators have implemented programs on these subjects. But even within the first period we still lack essential materials. For example we do not have an accurate ethnographic illustration of San Stefano Bulgaria, which represented some 80% of the true historic Bulgarian territories Because of this negligence on our part, foreign powers represent lands taken after the Berlin Treaty, not in their factual and original ethnic Bulgarian content, but in today's ethnographies without acknowledging the forced changes and falsifications contained therein.
The Macedonian Question, together with that of Adrianople, arose as an indivisible part of Bulgarian nationalism the day after the partition of Bulgaria in 1878, four decades before the creation of the Yugoslavian state. However under the lingering influence of the old YCP, Bulgaria chose at times to accept it as a part of the Balkan Question and thus as an internal Yugoslavian matter. Accordingly quite often, prevailing Bulgarian foreign policy, which more aptly may be termed political vacillation, seeks to repress efforts directed aimed at substantiation and evolution of the historic truth. This overt negligence (ignorance?) on the Macedonian Question includes not only the Press, but also extends to respected historic reviews and texts. Thus when discussion focuses on some very significant and basic questions we still allow ourselves to promote incorrect facts, and as always, to our own disadvantage. From this fact we may only conclude that national nihilism is a deep-seated feature of our character. These historic failures relate to three distinct themes - territory, ethnic composition and language.
The Ethic Composition
At the time of the Liberation the ethnic composition of Macedonia approximated that of Moesia and Thrace, comprising 67% Bulgarian-Christians. However while no one in Bulgaria recognises a mixed population in Moesia and Thrace they intuitively refer to it for Macedonia. And here again we witness another retreat from the historic truth. We know that before and after the Liberation there was no indigenous Serbian population in Macedonia, yet we often insist on providing numbers and percentages for its presence. Since the clear majority of people in Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia are Bulgarians, it is incorrect to consider or infer that a heterogenous population exists.
It is not to be presumed however, that all regions were ethnically homogenous. Within Macedonia there was a small number of Greeks and Albanians not present in Moesia, while in the latter there were Tartars absent from Macedonia. The similarity between these 3 historic Bulgarian provinces - Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia - is illustrated by the existence within all the regions of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans and the Gagauzi (Bulgarian-Christians who speak Turkish and Bulgarian). Because they related to the essence of the spiritual Bulgarian ethnic lands the outstanding Bulgarian poets of the past like Ivan Vazov (1850-1921), Petko Slaveykov (1827-95) and Peyo Yavorov (1878-1914), immortalized this same truth in their poems - "Where is Bulgaria", "Fatherland" and "Exiles". The first written by Vazov even before the Liberation.
Within the international forum the ethnographical details published on Macedonia by Vasil Kunchev, Professor Yordan Ivanov and Brankov are accurate and detailed. However they have not been revised and summarised into a form acceptable to the needs of foreign historians and authors, who usually compile historic reviews relying on published maps which in the main are either incomplete or unreliable. Bulgaria also has no available national reference atlas with colour maps, figures and tables detailing the ethnic composition of the separated parts of Macedonia, the heart of this continuing controversy. Sadly, even today there exists no motivation or plan to commence this important task. The same apathetic attitude applies to Eastern Thrace and the other lost territories.
The Language
The well known boundary of the "YA" (Yatova Granitza) divides the Bulgarian nation into the Eastern and Western dialects, and also passes through Macedonia. Therefore it is obvious that no common separate Bulgarian dialect exists for all the Macedonian region. On this issue we are guilty of supporting invalid conclusions which at times are construed or distorted to justify the existence of an "unique" Macedonian language.
The Skopje literary Macedonian language however is something quite separate. The genesis of this new literary language from basic Bulgarian is explained by the linguist Professor Konstantin Popov in "From the History of the Bulgarian Literary Language" (1985). The truth, which is quite apparent to us all, is that the so-called literary Macedonian language, except for its dialectic Bulgarian foundations, is a carefully designed and manipulated product aimed at ultimate dialectic fusion with the Serbian language. Convincing proof of this claim is evident when we consider the language of the Bulgarians of Banat in Romania. These people, for centuries lived in the realm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, isolated from Bulgaria, within a Catholic faith and using a Latin alphabet, with ancient words of which 22% were foreign. Yet today they still call their language "Bulgarian" and proclaim an absolute Bulgarian national consciousness. Significantly coercion was not a problem, unlike the current situation in Macedonia.
We must also reiterate that the countless periodicals, magazines and pamphlets of the MLM, as well as all publications in the occupied Macedonian lands and in Bulgaria itself (from before the Liberation to 1941) are written in the Bulgarian literary language. Notwithstanding the latter, immeasurable peculiarities of the Macedonian speech, like the syntax, phonetics and grammar (for example the triple article) are common features of Bulgarian, used in Moesia and in Thrace but not entering directly into the literary language.
Another issue on this theme concerns parts of the language in today's Kosovo, and the Serbian lands from the city of Prizren to the River Timok which have Bulgarian traits. Accordingly, linguistic theorists categorise them as separate dialects from the Serbo-Croatian language. However in reality this unique phenomenon not only establishes the historic evolution of these lands but also supports the historic and linguistic claims of the Bulgarian nation. To this population belong the Gorans who live north-west of the Shar mountain in Kosovo and speak only Bulgarian. In fact they are akin to the Bulgarian-Mohammedans. But now within Yugoslavia they quarrel whether these people are "Macedonian", Serbian or Albanian.
The Bulgar Wars
The third question concerns the nature of the wars, or more correctly, the essence of Bulgaria's participation. In the Bulgarian literature there are many differing resumes of these wars, yet not one can be described as entirely correct. While there were four wars this century, only the first (Balkan War 1912) is generally regarded as justified and liberationist, and this is mainly due to Lenin's description. By analogy the others are judged unjustified and conquering without any form of objective analysis relating to the participants or the aims of the Bulgarian state.
How can it be rationalised that of successive wars, each concerned with same Bulgarian ethnic lands, only one of them (during which Macedonia was partitioned and Greek and Turkish districts were appropriated in Thrace) could be declared honourable and liberationist? Furthermore, how is it possible that a war fought between Bulgaria and Serbia for a territory which was ethnically Bulgarian, can be labelled expansionist for both sides? Here we describe the inter-allied war of 1913, which certainly could be designated as politically and militarily opportunist but not as unjust. In fact was it not chauvinistic and unjustified of our allies (Serbia and Greece), whose sole aim was to appropriate Bulgarian territory within Macedonia, and ultimately to occupy Sofia and dictate a humiliating treaty in which the Bulgarian Nation would have been decimated. However the common Bulgarian soldier met this unprecedented threat to the Nation and saved it from what can only be termed a total rout.
While at that time we cannot denounce the patriotism of the ruling-class leadership, their adventurism and short-sightedness is open to severe criticism, for Bulgaria could have been a country of 150,000 km2. Only the patriotism of the people, and the ability of the army to rally after the first dehabilitating Balkan War, saved the country when they routed one of the Allied armies and sent the other into full retreat. Bulgaria was in truth defeated diplomatically, not militarily. The expression "national catastrophe" fully describes this war, where we apply the phrase "catastrophe" not to indicate a military, diplomatic or some other form of defeat but to signify that the Bulgarian people's ultimate goal, national unification, was gambled and lost.
Consider the situation in WWI: the Bulgaria army was at both fronts (South and North), but on its own ethnic lands in Macedonia and Dobrudja. The Bulgarian army in fact entered Bucharest and advanced to the River Prut, but did not leave the Balkan peninsula. This was despite the most unusual circumstances where Bulgaria was opposed to its liberator (Russia), allied with its centuries-old oppressor (Turkey), and was almost isolated against the Entente in the Balkans where it confronted the combined armies of the three Great Powers as well as the neighbouring states. The performance of the Bulgarian army to endure so long can only be described as outstanding. Yet in the midst of this titanic struggle the Bulgarian soldier could always see in front of him, to his right and to his left, Bulgarian villages and towns, his people. The remarkable heroism and endurance of the Bulgarian army and people during these bitter years can only be explained within the context of the people's desire for national unification. In this matter the psychological motivation of the Bulgarian soldier was clear and he had no need to ponder whether the cause was just.
The ruling-class interests, as exemplified by the Monarchy, coincided with the national aspirations of the people. That is why the people also chose war, although not with the enthusiasm of 1912. A terse account of the true Bulgarian position is available from German Field Marshall Makenzen's subdued criticism of Bulgaria's narrow political outlook:
The foregoing discussion of the Balkan Wars should not be interpreted as condoning the Bulgarian ruling-class and Monarchy, who with the Great Powers and their vassals, are responsible for the two Bulgarian national catastrophes. Bulgaria's leaders, instead of focussing on the national purpose, indulged themselves in games of power politics where they were completely outmanoeuvred and the nation suffered the consequences.
The assertion that Macedonia was ethnically Bulgarian, and therefore should be united with Bulgaria was opposed by the "Narrow-Socialists" [20] on the grounds that there was heterogeneity within the Macedonian population. They were also against Macedonian autonomy preferring the concept of a Balkan Federation. The Narrows declared that the policies of the ruling-class would not lead to national unification but instead to the enslavement of Bulgarian lands. Accordingly they were firmly opposed to the Wars, and the partition of Macedonia, the latter an attitude obviously held by IMRO as well. However while there were deficiencies within the Bulgarian ruling-class stance, the Narrows must have also been aware of, but chose to ignore, the fervid ambitions of the neighbouring Monarchies towards our Bulgarian lands.
Again we need to re-emphasize the two mutually exclusive themes - on one side the justified struggle for unification, on the other side the choice of Allies and defeat. It cannot be envisioned that just causes will always triumph. Defeat is neither an indictment nor an arbiter of the righteousness of the struggle. Were the April Rising (1876), Kresna-Razlog Rising (1878), Ilinden-Preobrazhenski (1903), September Rising (1923) and many others before and after that unjust? Defeat is not an indication of unjustness nor a reason to accuse the vanquished. It is irrational to imply that acknowledgment of the liberationist character of the wars sanctions territorial claims towards foreign lands. Firstly, the lands in question are ethnically Bulgarian and not foreign, and secondly, stating the factual historic evidence cannot be construed as expansionist! Bulgarian Tsars from Khan Krum (803-814) to Tsar Simeon (893-927) controlled the lands of present-day Romania, a large part of Hungary as well as Albania, yet we do not pursue those claims today.
In Yugoslavia they still ridicule and repudiate our contributions towards not only Macedonia, but also Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. They accuse our Army of poor conduct with respect to the local population. Behind these allegations they fail to reveal two important facts. Firstly, that many villages and large towns were liberated by the Bulgarian National Army only as part of the Third Ukrainian Front. Secondly, that Bulgaria annexed neither foreign, nor her own ethnic lands (Vardar Macedonia and the Western Provinces). We must not forget that the Bulgarian National Army liberated Vardar Macedonia twice, nationally in 1941, and as part of the social revolution in 1944. The Greater-Serbia ruling-class however conceal their injustices, such as how after WWI they imposed a boundary between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom (in fact Greater-Serbia). In a territory smaller than 2 districts, 25 Bulgarian villages and their fields in Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad districts, with the same population were partitioned in two. It is doubtful whether a State boundary exists anywhere in Europe which so clearly exposes the fanaticism of the Ruling-class leaders. This type of injustice continues to this very day.
The failure to comprehend Bulgaria's motives in the wars described hampers a proper understanding of why Bulgaria was in Vardar Macedonia during WWII. Bulgaria did not participate in this theatre as a primary combatant but rather in a policing role. In Serbia, as elsewhere, its main action was directed against the partizan units. Consider that both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in an effort to secure influence and allies, attempted to resolve some national issues (Slovak, Croatian, Albanian, Bulgarian and even the Hungarian).
The installed communist regime in Yugoslavia was considerably more barbarous to the population than the so-called fascist Bulgarians present earlier. Within Bulgaria there was no wholesale slaughter of non-Bulgarians, but in Yugoslavia countless Bulgarians, who were in fact designated Serbs, were massacred. That is why over 70% of the Serbian police forces were stationed in Macedonia, to control only 10% of Yugoslavia's geographic area. Their purpose was not only to ensure the Bulgarians were kept in servitude, but to facilitate their Serbianization by force. However, when we examine the most important indicator, that of ethnicity, we note that in South Dobrudja almost 50% of the population are Mohammedans, who we regard as mainly Turkish. In the unified part of Vardar Macedonia, by comparison the Bulgarians predominate at the 90% level.
Resolution of the Bulgarian national question, that is unification, could not be achieved with the ruling-class-democratic revolution at the time of Liberation. Similarly it was not realized after each of the four wars in which Bulgaria participated. The question, therefore, still remained to be resolved by the Socialist revolution. However it was not. While the BCP assumed a leading role in the antifascist struggle, it sacrificed its obligation towards national unification. The BCP hierarchy was lacking in individuals with the vision to seek the dual goals of national unification and Socialist revolution. The banner of national unification was therefore eliminated from the BCP's objectives. And this is where the tragedy and hypocrisy emanates, when we in the BCP label it as a middle class and fascist manifestation to speak of Greater Bulgaria. The fascists however are also responsible for their role in "gambling" away the national unification cause. Further they destroyed the campaigning committees in Macedonia (work of IMRO) because they were democratic organs, they split up the cadres, they conducted themselves badly towards the non-Bulgarians and thus made the national and class struggle more difficult. Unresolved by the Socialist revolution, the national question persists today as an antagonistic issue between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This predicament is a direct result of both Bulgarian national nihilism and Greater Serbian chauvinism!
Autonomy and Macedonism
We now address two new themes which contrast the Bulgarian and Serbian approaches to the Macedonian Question. These encompass the slogan for autonomy and the ideas of Macedonism. The notion of an autonomous Macedonia, as we all know, is a Bulgarian concept. It is accepted and carried by the Bulgarian national revolutionaries solely because of the interference of the Great Powers and the neighbouring monarchies who opposed national unification on the pretext of Balkan stability. At its core the slogan for autonomy sustains the national democratic thought for complete liberation and unification of the Bulgarian nation. Expressed within the new current thinking, autonomy was the initial aspiration of IMRO, and national unification the final one.
The quest for autonomy cannot be simply contemplated as an idea of the original Macedonian revolutionary movement of Dr Hristo Tatarchev, Dame Gruev, Gotse Delchev and the others. This very concept, adapted to the particular circumstances which followed the second partition of Macedonia, remained throughout the years after WWI.
As Todor Alexandroff wrote in 1919:
Further on Todor Alexandroff continues this theme:
The concept of Macedonism is an old Serbian ploy, a disguised variant of their open policy to Serbianize Macedonia and then annex the territory. The Serbian statesman Stoyan Novakovic is credited with conceiving the strategy of Macedonism in 1887. He summarised the notion as follow:
In essence what we see is a determined Greater-Serbian monarchist scheme to separate the Macedonians from the rest of the Bulgarian nation, and so absorb the land and completely assimilate the population.
The most quoted exponent of Macedonism prior to WWII is Krste Misirkov [32] (1874-1926), who was born in the western region of Aegean Macedonia. Misirkov, however, by the nature of his own articles, showed he had widely differing positions with respect to Bulgarian-Macedonians. Therefore while in 1903 he advocated Macedonism, in 1924 he declares himself a Bulgarian patriot.
From this initial comparison of the strategies relating to the Macedonian Question, we may readily observe that the Bulgarian and Serbian positions are diametrically opposed, since one is liberationist and just, the other expansionist and oppressive. To highlight that the slogan for autonomy and the ideas of Macedonism are both merely transitory tactics, one only has to review the historic record. When during the Balkan War and WWI Bulgaria controlled most of Macedonia and our unification seemed imminent, the slogan for autonomy was absent. However when Macedonia fell under national slavery in 1913 and 1919 the slogan for autonomy appeared once again, under the terms independence or self-determination for Macedonia. We see the same scenario also applies to Macedonism. On both occasions when Serbia conquered Vardar Macedonia, Macedonism was forgotten as they attempted to Serbianize the Bulgarians by force. While the Serbians had little success with Macedonism, it was adopted by the YCP because it speciously challenged existing Serbian nationalism. Later the same philosophy was sanctioned by the BCP to portray themselves as champions of understanding between all the Balkan people.
In the final analysis we cannot help but observe that an unofficial alliance had been forged amongst the Serbian ruling-class, the YCP and the BCP purely to prevent the honest aspiration of the Bulgarian-Macedonians for national unification. And that is why Macedonism remains a middle-class policy. The monarchist Serbian regime therefore not only opposed the Bulgarian belief for unification between Bulgaria and Macedonia but also the Bulgarian slogan for autonomy. Serbia viewed an autonomous Macedonia as a much greater threat to its expansionist policies than unification, for within negotiations for the latter Serbia may have been able to secure territorial concessions. An autonomous Macedonia however, could have later united with Bulgaria (cf East Rumelia) in a peaceful program and Serbia would have been totally excluded from the negotiation.
The original hostility of the Serbian kingdom towards the Bulgarian slogan for autonomy was explicitly reflected in its tactics on the Macedonian Question.
Firstly, the Serbian government attempted to establish relations with IMRO, by inferring that it would support their quest for autonomy if they:
• gave an undertaking not to seek union with Bulgaria
• allowed the Macedonian activities of Serbo-Macedonians (Serbomani)
Secondly, they approached the Bulgarian government to negotiate an overall policy on how to divide Macedonia into spheres of influence, that is its partition, if they were victorious against the Turks.
Thirdly, the Serbian government in discussions with the Turks, expressed a view that the Bulgarians represented the greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire and accordingly their organizations should be persecuted and destroyed, while the Turks should recognize a "Serbian" nationality existed within Macedonia.
Fourthly, they attempted to confuse and discourage the Bulgarian national self-realization amongst the people, by promoting a supposition that a large proportion of Slavs (43%) in Macedonia had no national self-awareness and could easily be indoctrinated by the ruling power.
The Bulgarian ruling-class leaders understood the Serbian connivance on the Macedonia Question, but in the interests of forming an united Christian Balkan front against Turkey, they acquiesced to some Serbian ideas (although they always defended the Bulgarian character of Macedonia). Later, however, the ideas of Macedonism, were manipulated and disguised by the Left, then accepted by the BCP as their own, without realizing their totally anti-Bulgarian nature. Consequently in the critical period between 1941-44, the unification issue was influenced by this latter fabrication, and this situation persisted for many years.
In order to highlight the nature of Macedonism and the incalculable damage it has done, several issues are pertinent. Within the history of the Third Bulgarian State a devastating fragmentation of its territory occurred three times. The first was a result of the Berlin Congress (1878) when the San Stefano lands were split into five sections. The second followed the Balkan wars (1913) when a four way division of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace occurred, as well as the loss of national Bulgarian land (South Dobrudja). Thus within the actual borders of Bulgaria remained only 50% of Eastern Thrace and only some 14% of Macedonia. The third, after WWI (1919) involved the appropriation of our national lands, the three parts of the Western Provinces, the Strumma district and Western Thrace, that is our outlet to the White Sea (Aegean). The territorial losses, in 1913 and 1919, can only be described as national tragedies.
Important Periods
In examining the conditions, and form of the struggle for national liberation since the appearance of the Macedonian Question to this very day, three distinct periods emerge.
The First period
From the Treaty of Berlin (1878) until the Balkan wars (1913), is characterized until the union with East Rumelia, with struggles for direct liberation and unification and then a struggle to achieve the autonomy of Macedonia and Adrianople.
From the Treaty of Berlin (1878) until the Balkan wars (1913), is characterized until the union with East Rumelia, with struggles for direct liberation and unification and then a struggle to achieve the autonomy of Macedonia and Adrianople.
The Second period
From the partition of Macedonia until the beginning of WWII in the Balkans, is characterized only at the beginning with a struggle for unification; then, after the second partition of Macedonia in 1919, with a struggle for national self-preservation.
From the partition of Macedonia until the beginning of WWII in the Balkans, is characterized only at the beginning with a struggle for unification; then, after the second partition of Macedonia in 1919, with a struggle for national self-preservation.
The Third period
From the transferring of the Macedonian Communist Party (MCP) in Vardar Macedonia to the Yugoslavian Communist Party (YCP), until the present, witnessed not only a continuous struggle for national self-preservation within Bulgaria, but also a rather late realization to defend the historic truth.
From the transferring of the Macedonian Communist Party (MCP) in Vardar Macedonia to the Yugoslavian Communist Party (YCP), until the present, witnessed not only a continuous struggle for national self-preservation within Bulgaria, but also a rather late realization to defend the historic truth.
We consider these periods, not as of critical importance to Macedonian history, but to highlight how within the passage of time the Bulgarian position has been continually eroded. Accordingly, we have to alternatively consider the struggle for national unification and autonomy, the resistance to denationalization and finally the importance of the historic truth and its appropriate recognition.
Unfortunately in our historiography we only have factual works for the first period (so-called Ottoman), the other two subjects are still at an elementary phase. However, it is important to acknowledge that some historians and translators have implemented programs on these subjects. But even within the first period we still lack essential materials. For example we do not have an accurate ethnographic illustration of San Stefano Bulgaria, which represented some 80% of the true historic Bulgarian territories Because of this negligence on our part, foreign powers represent lands taken after the Berlin Treaty, not in their factual and original ethnic Bulgarian content, but in today's ethnographies without acknowledging the forced changes and falsifications contained therein.
The Macedonian Question, together with that of Adrianople, arose as an indivisible part of Bulgarian nationalism the day after the partition of Bulgaria in 1878, four decades before the creation of the Yugoslavian state. However under the lingering influence of the old YCP, Bulgaria chose at times to accept it as a part of the Balkan Question and thus as an internal Yugoslavian matter. Accordingly quite often, prevailing Bulgarian foreign policy, which more aptly may be termed political vacillation, seeks to repress efforts directed aimed at substantiation and evolution of the historic truth. This overt negligence (ignorance?) on the Macedonian Question includes not only the Press, but also extends to respected historic reviews and texts. Thus when discussion focuses on some very significant and basic questions we still allow ourselves to promote incorrect facts, and as always, to our own disadvantage. From this fact we may only conclude that national nihilism is a deep-seated feature of our character. These historic failures relate to three distinct themes - territory, ethnic composition and language.
The Ethic Composition
At the time of the Liberation the ethnic composition of Macedonia approximated that of Moesia and Thrace, comprising 67% Bulgarian-Christians. However while no one in Bulgaria recognises a mixed population in Moesia and Thrace they intuitively refer to it for Macedonia. And here again we witness another retreat from the historic truth. We know that before and after the Liberation there was no indigenous Serbian population in Macedonia, yet we often insist on providing numbers and percentages for its presence. Since the clear majority of people in Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia are Bulgarians, it is incorrect to consider or infer that a heterogenous population exists.
It is not to be presumed however, that all regions were ethnically homogenous. Within Macedonia there was a small number of Greeks and Albanians not present in Moesia, while in the latter there were Tartars absent from Macedonia. The similarity between these 3 historic Bulgarian provinces - Moesia, Thrace and Macedonia - is illustrated by the existence within all the regions of the Bulgarian-Mohammedans and the Gagauzi (Bulgarian-Christians who speak Turkish and Bulgarian). Because they related to the essence of the spiritual Bulgarian ethnic lands the outstanding Bulgarian poets of the past like Ivan Vazov (1850-1921), Petko Slaveykov (1827-95) and Peyo Yavorov (1878-1914), immortalized this same truth in their poems - "Where is Bulgaria", "Fatherland" and "Exiles". The first written by Vazov even before the Liberation.
Within the international forum the ethnographical details published on Macedonia by Vasil Kunchev, Professor Yordan Ivanov and Brankov are accurate and detailed. However they have not been revised and summarised into a form acceptable to the needs of foreign historians and authors, who usually compile historic reviews relying on published maps which in the main are either incomplete or unreliable. Bulgaria also has no available national reference atlas with colour maps, figures and tables detailing the ethnic composition of the separated parts of Macedonia, the heart of this continuing controversy. Sadly, even today there exists no motivation or plan to commence this important task. The same apathetic attitude applies to Eastern Thrace and the other lost territories.
The Language
The well known boundary of the "YA" (Yatova Granitza) divides the Bulgarian nation into the Eastern and Western dialects, and also passes through Macedonia. Therefore it is obvious that no common separate Bulgarian dialect exists for all the Macedonian region. On this issue we are guilty of supporting invalid conclusions which at times are construed or distorted to justify the existence of an "unique" Macedonian language.
The Skopje literary Macedonian language however is something quite separate. The genesis of this new literary language from basic Bulgarian is explained by the linguist Professor Konstantin Popov in "From the History of the Bulgarian Literary Language" (1985). The truth, which is quite apparent to us all, is that the so-called literary Macedonian language, except for its dialectic Bulgarian foundations, is a carefully designed and manipulated product aimed at ultimate dialectic fusion with the Serbian language. Convincing proof of this claim is evident when we consider the language of the Bulgarians of Banat in Romania. These people, for centuries lived in the realm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, isolated from Bulgaria, within a Catholic faith and using a Latin alphabet, with ancient words of which 22% were foreign. Yet today they still call their language "Bulgarian" and proclaim an absolute Bulgarian national consciousness. Significantly coercion was not a problem, unlike the current situation in Macedonia.
We must also reiterate that the countless periodicals, magazines and pamphlets of the MLM, as well as all publications in the occupied Macedonian lands and in Bulgaria itself (from before the Liberation to 1941) are written in the Bulgarian literary language. Notwithstanding the latter, immeasurable peculiarities of the Macedonian speech, like the syntax, phonetics and grammar (for example the triple article) are common features of Bulgarian, used in Moesia and in Thrace but not entering directly into the literary language.
Another issue on this theme concerns parts of the language in today's Kosovo, and the Serbian lands from the city of Prizren to the River Timok which have Bulgarian traits. Accordingly, linguistic theorists categorise them as separate dialects from the Serbo-Croatian language. However in reality this unique phenomenon not only establishes the historic evolution of these lands but also supports the historic and linguistic claims of the Bulgarian nation. To this population belong the Gorans who live north-west of the Shar mountain in Kosovo and speak only Bulgarian. In fact they are akin to the Bulgarian-Mohammedans. But now within Yugoslavia they quarrel whether these people are "Macedonian", Serbian or Albanian.
The Bulgar Wars
The third question concerns the nature of the wars, or more correctly, the essence of Bulgaria's participation. In the Bulgarian literature there are many differing resumes of these wars, yet not one can be described as entirely correct. While there were four wars this century, only the first (Balkan War 1912) is generally regarded as justified and liberationist, and this is mainly due to Lenin's description. By analogy the others are judged unjustified and conquering without any form of objective analysis relating to the participants or the aims of the Bulgarian state.
How can it be rationalised that of successive wars, each concerned with same Bulgarian ethnic lands, only one of them (during which Macedonia was partitioned and Greek and Turkish districts were appropriated in Thrace) could be declared honourable and liberationist? Furthermore, how is it possible that a war fought between Bulgaria and Serbia for a territory which was ethnically Bulgarian, can be labelled expansionist for both sides? Here we describe the inter-allied war of 1913, which certainly could be designated as politically and militarily opportunist but not as unjust. In fact was it not chauvinistic and unjustified of our allies (Serbia and Greece), whose sole aim was to appropriate Bulgarian territory within Macedonia, and ultimately to occupy Sofia and dictate a humiliating treaty in which the Bulgarian Nation would have been decimated. However the common Bulgarian soldier met this unprecedented threat to the Nation and saved it from what can only be termed a total rout.
While at that time we cannot denounce the patriotism of the ruling-class leadership, their adventurism and short-sightedness is open to severe criticism, for Bulgaria could have been a country of 150,000 km2. Only the patriotism of the people, and the ability of the army to rally after the first dehabilitating Balkan War, saved the country when they routed one of the Allied armies and sent the other into full retreat. Bulgaria was in truth defeated diplomatically, not militarily. The expression "national catastrophe" fully describes this war, where we apply the phrase "catastrophe" not to indicate a military, diplomatic or some other form of defeat but to signify that the Bulgarian people's ultimate goal, national unification, was gambled and lost.
Consider the situation in WWI: the Bulgaria army was at both fronts (South and North), but on its own ethnic lands in Macedonia and Dobrudja. The Bulgarian army in fact entered Bucharest and advanced to the River Prut, but did not leave the Balkan peninsula. This was despite the most unusual circumstances where Bulgaria was opposed to its liberator (Russia), allied with its centuries-old oppressor (Turkey), and was almost isolated against the Entente in the Balkans where it confronted the combined armies of the three Great Powers as well as the neighbouring states. The performance of the Bulgarian army to endure so long can only be described as outstanding. Yet in the midst of this titanic struggle the Bulgarian soldier could always see in front of him, to his right and to his left, Bulgarian villages and towns, his people. The remarkable heroism and endurance of the Bulgarian army and people during these bitter years can only be explained within the context of the people's desire for national unification. In this matter the psychological motivation of the Bulgarian soldier was clear and he had no need to ponder whether the cause was just.
The ruling-class interests, as exemplified by the Monarchy, coincided with the national aspirations of the people. That is why the people also chose war, although not with the enthusiasm of 1912. A terse account of the true Bulgarian position is available from German Field Marshall Makenzen's subdued criticism of Bulgaria's narrow political outlook:
"the Bulgarian has shown that in battle he is a heroic soldier... He possessed the most fervid patriotism but was only concerned with realization of nationalistic objectives. His vision did not extend beyond those regions inhabited by his countrymen".
Here the different nature of Bulgaria's participation is corroborated by the Germans who viewed the Wars as the beginning of a global imperialistic campaign. All this information is poignantly summarised in the late Professor Simeon Damyanov's astute text "Bulgaria and the Balkan States 1912-1918" published in 1986.The foregoing discussion of the Balkan Wars should not be interpreted as condoning the Bulgarian ruling-class and Monarchy, who with the Great Powers and their vassals, are responsible for the two Bulgarian national catastrophes. Bulgaria's leaders, instead of focussing on the national purpose, indulged themselves in games of power politics where they were completely outmanoeuvred and the nation suffered the consequences.
The assertion that Macedonia was ethnically Bulgarian, and therefore should be united with Bulgaria was opposed by the "Narrow-Socialists" [20] on the grounds that there was heterogeneity within the Macedonian population. They were also against Macedonian autonomy preferring the concept of a Balkan Federation. The Narrows declared that the policies of the ruling-class would not lead to national unification but instead to the enslavement of Bulgarian lands. Accordingly they were firmly opposed to the Wars, and the partition of Macedonia, the latter an attitude obviously held by IMRO as well. However while there were deficiencies within the Bulgarian ruling-class stance, the Narrows must have also been aware of, but chose to ignore, the fervid ambitions of the neighbouring Monarchies towards our Bulgarian lands.
Again we need to re-emphasize the two mutually exclusive themes - on one side the justified struggle for unification, on the other side the choice of Allies and defeat. It cannot be envisioned that just causes will always triumph. Defeat is neither an indictment nor an arbiter of the righteousness of the struggle. Were the April Rising (1876), Kresna-Razlog Rising (1878), Ilinden-Preobrazhenski (1903), September Rising (1923) and many others before and after that unjust? Defeat is not an indication of unjustness nor a reason to accuse the vanquished. It is irrational to imply that acknowledgment of the liberationist character of the wars sanctions territorial claims towards foreign lands. Firstly, the lands in question are ethnically Bulgarian and not foreign, and secondly, stating the factual historic evidence cannot be construed as expansionist! Bulgarian Tsars from Khan Krum (803-814) to Tsar Simeon (893-927) controlled the lands of present-day Romania, a large part of Hungary as well as Albania, yet we do not pursue those claims today.
In Yugoslavia they still ridicule and repudiate our contributions towards not only Macedonia, but also Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. They accuse our Army of poor conduct with respect to the local population. Behind these allegations they fail to reveal two important facts. Firstly, that many villages and large towns were liberated by the Bulgarian National Army only as part of the Third Ukrainian Front. Secondly, that Bulgaria annexed neither foreign, nor her own ethnic lands (Vardar Macedonia and the Western Provinces). We must not forget that the Bulgarian National Army liberated Vardar Macedonia twice, nationally in 1941, and as part of the social revolution in 1944. The Greater-Serbia ruling-class however conceal their injustices, such as how after WWI they imposed a boundary between Bulgaria and the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom (in fact Greater-Serbia). In a territory smaller than 2 districts, 25 Bulgarian villages and their fields in Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad districts, with the same population were partitioned in two. It is doubtful whether a State boundary exists anywhere in Europe which so clearly exposes the fanaticism of the Ruling-class leaders. This type of injustice continues to this very day.
The failure to comprehend Bulgaria's motives in the wars described hampers a proper understanding of why Bulgaria was in Vardar Macedonia during WWII. Bulgaria did not participate in this theatre as a primary combatant but rather in a policing role. In Serbia, as elsewhere, its main action was directed against the partizan units. Consider that both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in an effort to secure influence and allies, attempted to resolve some national issues (Slovak, Croatian, Albanian, Bulgarian and even the Hungarian).
The installed communist regime in Yugoslavia was considerably more barbarous to the population than the so-called fascist Bulgarians present earlier. Within Bulgaria there was no wholesale slaughter of non-Bulgarians, but in Yugoslavia countless Bulgarians, who were in fact designated Serbs, were massacred. That is why over 70% of the Serbian police forces were stationed in Macedonia, to control only 10% of Yugoslavia's geographic area. Their purpose was not only to ensure the Bulgarians were kept in servitude, but to facilitate their Serbianization by force. However, when we examine the most important indicator, that of ethnicity, we note that in South Dobrudja almost 50% of the population are Mohammedans, who we regard as mainly Turkish. In the unified part of Vardar Macedonia, by comparison the Bulgarians predominate at the 90% level.
Resolution of the Bulgarian national question, that is unification, could not be achieved with the ruling-class-democratic revolution at the time of Liberation. Similarly it was not realized after each of the four wars in which Bulgaria participated. The question, therefore, still remained to be resolved by the Socialist revolution. However it was not. While the BCP assumed a leading role in the antifascist struggle, it sacrificed its obligation towards national unification. The BCP hierarchy was lacking in individuals with the vision to seek the dual goals of national unification and Socialist revolution. The banner of national unification was therefore eliminated from the BCP's objectives. And this is where the tragedy and hypocrisy emanates, when we in the BCP label it as a middle class and fascist manifestation to speak of Greater Bulgaria. The fascists however are also responsible for their role in "gambling" away the national unification cause. Further they destroyed the campaigning committees in Macedonia (work of IMRO) because they were democratic organs, they split up the cadres, they conducted themselves badly towards the non-Bulgarians and thus made the national and class struggle more difficult. Unresolved by the Socialist revolution, the national question persists today as an antagonistic issue between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This predicament is a direct result of both Bulgarian national nihilism and Greater Serbian chauvinism!
Autonomy and Macedonism
We now address two new themes which contrast the Bulgarian and Serbian approaches to the Macedonian Question. These encompass the slogan for autonomy and the ideas of Macedonism. The notion of an autonomous Macedonia, as we all know, is a Bulgarian concept. It is accepted and carried by the Bulgarian national revolutionaries solely because of the interference of the Great Powers and the neighbouring monarchies who opposed national unification on the pretext of Balkan stability. At its core the slogan for autonomy sustains the national democratic thought for complete liberation and unification of the Bulgarian nation. Expressed within the new current thinking, autonomy was the initial aspiration of IMRO, and national unification the final one.
The quest for autonomy cannot be simply contemplated as an idea of the original Macedonian revolutionary movement of Dr Hristo Tatarchev, Dame Gruev, Gotse Delchev and the others. This very concept, adapted to the particular circumstances which followed the second partition of Macedonia, remained throughout the years after WWI.
As Todor Alexandroff wrote in 1919:
"IMRO never presumed that in its Constitution the term independent (autonomous) Macedonia meant a conclusion ... the Constitution cited as an objective:- autonomy for Macedonia but as a transitional phase. This objective was not only understood by the original founders of the Organization, but by almost all of their comrades and successors, by all the Macedonian intelligentsia and the entire Macedonian population".
Further on Todor Alexandroff continues this theme:
"It is not true that the emigrants of the autonomists wanted independence and not unification. Exactly the opposite is true, because we all realize that autonomy would only lead to new unknown struggles...We all accepted the autonomy of Macedonia as a lesser evil when unification was an impossibility... The Bulgarian population of Macedonia is unanimous for the union with Bulgaria, if it can be accomplished. This is foremost in the people's hearts... In Macedonia we, more than any other organization, know what the Bulgarian population desires since our support there is very strong".
The concept of Macedonism is an old Serbian ploy, a disguised variant of their open policy to Serbianize Macedonia and then annex the territory. The Serbian statesman Stoyan Novakovic is credited with conceiving the strategy of Macedonism in 1887. He summarised the notion as follow:
"If the Macedonian Bulgarians cannot be Serbianized directly, then their national unity must be broken by producing within them a belief that they are neither Serbians nor Bulgarians."
In essence what we see is a determined Greater-Serbian monarchist scheme to separate the Macedonians from the rest of the Bulgarian nation, and so absorb the land and completely assimilate the population.
The most quoted exponent of Macedonism prior to WWII is Krste Misirkov [32] (1874-1926), who was born in the western region of Aegean Macedonia. Misirkov, however, by the nature of his own articles, showed he had widely differing positions with respect to Bulgarian-Macedonians. Therefore while in 1903 he advocated Macedonism, in 1924 he declares himself a Bulgarian patriot.
From this initial comparison of the strategies relating to the Macedonian Question, we may readily observe that the Bulgarian and Serbian positions are diametrically opposed, since one is liberationist and just, the other expansionist and oppressive. To highlight that the slogan for autonomy and the ideas of Macedonism are both merely transitory tactics, one only has to review the historic record. When during the Balkan War and WWI Bulgaria controlled most of Macedonia and our unification seemed imminent, the slogan for autonomy was absent. However when Macedonia fell under national slavery in 1913 and 1919 the slogan for autonomy appeared once again, under the terms independence or self-determination for Macedonia. We see the same scenario also applies to Macedonism. On both occasions when Serbia conquered Vardar Macedonia, Macedonism was forgotten as they attempted to Serbianize the Bulgarians by force. While the Serbians had little success with Macedonism, it was adopted by the YCP because it speciously challenged existing Serbian nationalism. Later the same philosophy was sanctioned by the BCP to portray themselves as champions of understanding between all the Balkan people.
In the final analysis we cannot help but observe that an unofficial alliance had been forged amongst the Serbian ruling-class, the YCP and the BCP purely to prevent the honest aspiration of the Bulgarian-Macedonians for national unification. And that is why Macedonism remains a middle-class policy. The monarchist Serbian regime therefore not only opposed the Bulgarian belief for unification between Bulgaria and Macedonia but also the Bulgarian slogan for autonomy. Serbia viewed an autonomous Macedonia as a much greater threat to its expansionist policies than unification, for within negotiations for the latter Serbia may have been able to secure territorial concessions. An autonomous Macedonia however, could have later united with Bulgaria (cf East Rumelia) in a peaceful program and Serbia would have been totally excluded from the negotiation.
The original hostility of the Serbian kingdom towards the Bulgarian slogan for autonomy was explicitly reflected in its tactics on the Macedonian Question.
Firstly, the Serbian government attempted to establish relations with IMRO, by inferring that it would support their quest for autonomy if they:
• gave an undertaking not to seek union with Bulgaria
• allowed the Macedonian activities of Serbo-Macedonians (Serbomani)
Secondly, they approached the Bulgarian government to negotiate an overall policy on how to divide Macedonia into spheres of influence, that is its partition, if they were victorious against the Turks.
Thirdly, the Serbian government in discussions with the Turks, expressed a view that the Bulgarians represented the greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire and accordingly their organizations should be persecuted and destroyed, while the Turks should recognize a "Serbian" nationality existed within Macedonia.
Fourthly, they attempted to confuse and discourage the Bulgarian national self-realization amongst the people, by promoting a supposition that a large proportion of Slavs (43%) in Macedonia had no national self-awareness and could easily be indoctrinated by the ruling power.
The Bulgarian ruling-class leaders understood the Serbian connivance on the Macedonia Question, but in the interests of forming an united Christian Balkan front against Turkey, they acquiesced to some Serbian ideas (although they always defended the Bulgarian character of Macedonia). Later, however, the ideas of Macedonism, were manipulated and disguised by the Left, then accepted by the BCP as their own, without realizing their totally anti-Bulgarian nature. Consequently in the critical period between 1941-44, the unification issue was influenced by this latter fabrication, and this situation persisted for many years.
In order to highlight the nature of Macedonism and the incalculable damage it has done, several issues are pertinent. Within the history of the Third Bulgarian State a devastating fragmentation of its territory occurred three times. The first was a result of the Berlin Congress (1878) when the San Stefano lands were split into five sections. The second followed the Balkan wars (1913) when a four way division of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace occurred, as well as the loss of national Bulgarian land (South Dobrudja). Thus within the actual borders of Bulgaria remained only 50% of Eastern Thrace and only some 14% of Macedonia. The third, after WWI (1919) involved the appropriation of our national lands, the three parts of the Western Provinces, the Strumma district and Western Thrace, that is our outlet to the White Sea (Aegean). The territorial losses, in 1913 and 1919, can only be described as national tragedies.
Bulgarian Ethnic Territory lost at the Treaty of Berlin (June 1878) from San Stefano Bulgaria - [1] given to Serbia - [2] and [3] returned to Turkey - [4] given to Romania.
